Can We Win the War on Terror?

The past decade has seen a sharp spike in terrorist activities around the world. Just last year suicide bombers targeted the American luxury hotels JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton in Jakarta. Nine people were killed, including the bombers. A splinter group from terrorist outfit Jemaah Islamiyah claimed responsibility.

These events are significant because it shows the war on terror is still front and centre in global politics. What people and policymakers all around the world want to know is the answer to a deceptively simple question: Can we win the war on terror?

The answer is: It depends. It depends on what it means to achieve victory, and how much time and money we are willing to spend.

First, what does it mean to win – to achieve victory in the war on terror?

Victory exists on three levels. First, tactical victories: We find, capture, or kill terrorists who are planning or actually conducting attacks.

Second, strategic victories: We disrupt or destroy terrorist networks and leaders who are involved in planning attacks or creating support systems – money, access to technologies, including the internet – that permit them to operate in a state or region.

Third, grand strategic victory: We destroy the ideological reasons, often disaffection with political-economic systems, which create terrorist recruits in the first place.

What does this mean?

If by win, we mean “tactical victories”, those are easy to achieve – in fact, we do so virtually every day of the week. In Afghanistan alone, US, NATO, and Pakistani military forces and intelligence services find and kill extremists. The problem is that terrorist organisations can easily find new terrorist recruits.

If we mean “strategic victories”, these are more difficult to achieve, but we routinely find, attack, and disrupt terrorist networks and their leaders. The problem is that new networks and organisations pop up as soon as others are destroyed.

And if we mean “grand strategic victory”, this is exceptionally difficult to achieve – and perhaps may not be achieved for generations.

The problem is that eliminating the ideology of discontent and disaffection that spawns terrorism is close to impossible. There always will be individuals who seek to use terror to destroy governments and achieve power in their own right.

Second, how long will it take to win the war on terror?

The problem is that democracies are, as a practical matter, relatively impatient when dealing with problems that require long-term solutions. Killing terrorists, finding and disrupting terrorist networks and support systems, are routine occurrences. But these tactical and strategic “victories” do not solve the fundamental problem.

To make matters worse, a grand strategic victory is a long-term endeavour – likely taking generations, if ever – before we can eliminate the threat posed by individuals who seek to kill people and destroy governments.

Governments can achieve short-term wins, but likely cannot eradicate the sources of terrorism. We may never “win” the war on terror – achieve grand strategic victory – if we mean eliminating the sources of terrorism. Dealing effectively with terrorism likely will take decades.

So where do we go from here?

While 9/11 defined terrorism as an American problem, terror attacks are a global problem. In Asia, terrorists conducted major attacks in Indonesia, India, Philippines, and Thailand. The November 2008 Mumbai, India terror attack killed 173 and wounded more than 300.

In the end, the best strategy is to reduce the sources of terrorism, while accepting that grand strategic victory is not in sight, at least not for now.

Once policymakers and the public understand that victory in the war on terror is a generational problem, which is unlikely to produce the “victory moment” that signals the end of the war, they are better prepared psychologically to wage the “long fight” against terrorism.